The author still has one last misconception about passkeys, namely that if you lose a passkey, you have "no recourse."
People wrongly think passkeys are like Bitcoin wallets, where losing them means there's absolutely nothing you can do, your account is simply lost forever.
Losing a passkey is exactly like losing your password, which is to say, that for 99% of services, you can reset your password/passkey really easily. There's a prominent "Reset Password" button right on the login form. It sends you an email or an SMS, you click it, and it lets you reset right then and there. You can reset your passkey in exactly the same way.
It is not that easy to reset if you lose your password to your Apple, Google, Facebook, etc. They all have a bunch of factors that they use to authenticate you if you reset your password, and they don't even document which ones they use.
So, if you care about those accounts, you've got to make sure you have backup access. They all let you generate and print "backup codes" (emergency passwords) and store them in a fireproof safe or a literal bank vault. Do that!
As everybody knows, you can't store all of your passwords in a password manager. You need something outside of the password manager to login to the manager itself. That's why 1Password/LastPass is called that; you still need one last password that you keep and manage yourself.
That's true of passkeys, too. You can login to Google with passkey, but if Google is your password manager that stores your passkey, you need something else outside of Google's password manager to login to Google. Whether it's a password, a backup code, a YubiKey, whatever, you need one more thing to login to Google, ideally more than one, so you can back it up and keep it safe.
Pre-passkeys, was this lockout issue a true issue with apple and google accounts? Or have passkeys added a general lockout issue that didn't exist before? Also passkeys in their current implementation are not possible to back up or export yourself, unlike passwords in the past.
Security engineers are prioritizing preventing key copying over lockout issues, unilaterally, on literally billions of people. It improves their metrics internally, at the cost of an externality on the entire world. This kind of stuff invites odious regulation as more and more stories of lockout with no recourse surface.
And unlike passwords, there is no good provider migration story. There is a roach motel issue. Yes it is being 'worked on', but passkeys and such have been out for many years, the willful denial whenever you ask people running these standards about these issues is incredibly irritating. The fact they tend to avoid questions about this like politicians decreases trust in the motives of such standards.
> unlike passwords, there is no good provider migration story
I'm curious what the "good provider migration story" you're referring to here for passwords is?
Password managers by-and-large haven't agreed on a standardised interchange format for import/export - a few of them have some compatibility helpers for importing from specific popular competitors but they're all in different formats, no consistent formats.
The above goes for passkeys as it does passwords - import/export will include your passkeys - so I don't see much difference in the provider migration story.
On the other hand, the FIDO Credential Exchange Format does solve the above problem (if/when providers choose to adopt it), so passkeys are at least further along the path of creating a "good provider migration story" than passwords ever were.
No, passkeys haven't added a new general lockout issue, because Apple, Google, etc. don't allow you to create an account where you can only login via passkey with no external authentication factor. They require you have something outside the Google account, whether that's a password, a hardware key, etc.
People keep falsely imagining that Google is setting people up with passkey-only accounts, with no way to backup their login credentials. Gosh, wouldn't that be terrible?
That would be like 1Password letting you create a passkey-only account with no password, storing the only passkey in 1Password. The whole idea makes no sense. 1Password doesn't do that, and neither does Apple, Google, Microsoft, etc. (We can all imagine them doing something that stupid, but, it turns out, they don't.)
Pre-passkeys, the most common lost-credential scenario was creating a fresh Gmail address on a new device (an Android phone) with a password and forgetting both your Google password and your password for your cellular-phone carrier (AT&T, T-Mobile, etc). Your Google password would be stored locally on your phone and in Google's cloud, but when you lose your phone and forget your passwords, no backups remain.
At that point, you're pretty much screwed. Google can't email you a reset-password link, because Gmail is your email. Google can't send you a 2FA SMS until you get a new phone with the same number, but you can't convince AT&T to do that, because they want to send a reset-password link to your email, which you don't have, or SMS to your phone, which you don't have.
(The cellular carriers don't even allow you to show government ID at a physical store. They don't allow you to take over a phone number that way, because people could then threaten/bribe a T-Mobile store representative to falsely claim that you presented valid government ID, taking over other people's accounts. If you walk into a store, they'll just put you on the phone with customer service, where they'll insist that you provide your AT&T password, or reset your password via email or SMS. If you've lost your email and your phone and all your passwords, you're completely out of luck.)
If Google allowed you to create a passkey-only account, with no SMS 2FA and no way to backup your passkey, that would be even worse.
But, luckily for all of us, they don't even allow that, and they're certainly not pushing it unilaterally on billions of people.
Yes. People have complained about the difficulty of Google or Facebook account recovery and how they need to make it easier and more accurate for ages. You could search hn for "password reset" or "lost password" and you'll find tons.
This is not a feature of passkeys, this is a feature of each and every individual provider building their own unique reset flow.
Not every provider does this correctly. Just yesterday I saw someone complaining on mastodon about their passkeys being locked and requiring a phone call to get reset.
Passkeys are exactly as resettable as passwords, which depends on your provider actually implementing things correctly.
Apple and Google often store your other 99% of passwords and passkeys, so losing this is actually more important than losing the 99%. I take your point but saying 99% have reset services when the critical 1% may never be recoverable without posting to HN is an important point.
For those you add recovery e-mails. You can easily have a Google, Microsoft and Yahoo e-mail so having access to at least one means you can recover the rest. Yes, this increases your attack surface, but the chances remain miniscule.
Also, just so I'm clear, there's no requirement to share passkeys. Or even have passkeys enabled on all devices, right?
If I log in to a site from my machine, and set up a passkey, but then log into that site from another machine, it'll just see no passkey present and ask for my password, yes?
A passkey is a local password on a device that could be shared through all the password manager gymnastics, but its not required as I understand it.
Yes, that's right. It might also make sense to generate multiple passkeys for an account. For example, a separate one for logging in from Apple devices.
1. Passkey prompts asking if I want to use a phone or security key when I only have one (or neither!) registered. The UI for this gets in the way and should only ever present itself if I happen to have both kinds of devices registered.
2. Passkeys should have had the portability and flexibility that ssh keys have from the start. Making it so your grandparents can use public key cryptography and gain a significant advantage in securing their accounts in a user friendly manner should have been the priority. Seems like vendor lock-in was the goal from the start.
On Mac with the security key you can just press the button on the security key before choosing a path. It only looks like a required extra step but in practice it is optional.
Passkeys seem to be the best solution for users whose technical chops cannot be trusted, and who are also gullible enough to be a scam / social engineering target. Which, to my mind, describes a large enough chunk of audience of most popular services.
A tech-savvy relative of such a user should help them generate rescue codes, write them on a piece of paper, and store them along with all other important documents. Ideally the paper should also read: "Call me before using any of these codes! <phone number>."
A "user agent", I suppose. The agent could identify you to online services, and it does. Remembering and typing a passphrase is often too hard (or "too hard") for some users. A passkey is better than a password like 123456 or name + year of birth, or other such "easy to remember" passwords people invent to avoid remembering a passphrase. Especially if you have a hundred logins.
A passkey basically offloads user identification to the OS (especially a mobile OS). It should not be the only way to identify though.
An ssh-style key + password is fine. A username + password + TOTP should also be fine. But 99.9% of passwords should be in a password manager anyway.
Rescue codes should always be generated and written down when activating a passkey or similar, but this requires certain discipline, some feeling of importance. And many web sites that require registration don't seem important for users, especially one-time users. What makes sense for your Google account, or your bank account, feels like too much ceremony for a low-stakes login like a random online store; losing a login to it does not feel like a big loss to many people.
>The UI for this gets in the way and should only ever present itself if I happen to have both kinds of devices registered.
I disagree. It is very annoying when some service fails to show an option on the grounds that I can't use it. It makes it difficult to resolve problems. If the option is just missing, I have no way to tell whether the company doesn't provide the option, whether the company made some sort of mistake (they can't provide an email option because they lost my email), whether I made a mistake, or whether the company just has a bad UI that tries to hide the option. And don't forget the situation where I tried to google online for some help in using the UI, I found a 6 month old Reddit post showing the option, and I can't figure out if the company changed the UI in the past six months.
They should show it greyed out with a note "no key of this type registered".
> Seems like vendor lock-in was the goal from the start.
Exactly. The passkey vendors state that the goal was to make phishing not just difficult but impossible. This means plaintext access to your credentials is forbidden forever, regardless of your level of expertise, and regardless of the complexity of the process to export/import them. The purpose of the so-called "secure credential exchange" is once again to prevent you from directly accessing your credentials. You can go from one passkey vendor to another, but you're always locked in to one passkey vendor or another.
Any credential system that makes it impossible to write something down on a piece of paper, take it to a new computer, and login to a website is just a gateway to vendor lock-in. You can manually manage your own ssh keys but for some reason not your passkeys.
As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. [EDIT: Obviously I'm talking about built-in support. I'm well aware of third-party software, so everyone can stop replying to this now, please!] You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.
The passkey vendors took some good theoretical ideas, such as site-specific credentials and public-key cryptography, and totally mangled the implementation, making it hostile to everyone except themselves.
This is not true - browsers including Safari support passkeys managed by third-party password managers.
I'm using 1Password with browser extensions for Safari and Chrome on macOS and iOS and it works seamlessly with my passkeys, which are not stored in iCloud Keychain.
> you're always locked in to one passkey vendor or another.
> This is not true - Safari also supports passkeys managed by third-party password managers.
I think you know what I meant and are just being pedantic here for no good reason.
Do you think I'm unaware of 1Password? I don't want to use 1Password any more than I want to use iCloud Keychain.
Technically, pendantically, Safari "supports" anything that third-party Safari extensions support. I'm a Safari extension developer myself. But this is totally different from how Safari supports the use of passwords, which is all built in, requires no third-party software, can be local-only, allows plaintext export/import, etc.
Reading the cfx spec [1], the raw private key is exported as a base64 encoded der. I don't understand what your concern is here. It appears that any cfx export file is not tied to a specific service to service import path, but can be imported into anything, or just used locally with self written tools.
OK I see what you mean. Having the ability to switch between vendors but not the ability to export your data locally (e.g. as plaintext keys) is a new meaning of "vendor lock-in" I hadn't considered before.
Yes. User freedom is not all-or-nothing. There are degrees, and the tech companies are coming up with fiendish new ways to lock away your data from you. So in the case of passkeys, you can technically move your data between vendors, though that can be quite inconvenient as the submitted article mentions, but nonetheless every vendor locks away your data from you, and most vendors have a financial incentive to keep your data away from you, so that you have to pay for the services.
Once "secure credential exchange" becomes supported by commercial credential managers, what's to stop someone implementing an open source password manager that implements the standard and allows local export in plaintext?
This is obviously kicking the can down the road, but I "solve" this problem by storing passkeys in a third-party credential manager that supports them. That way I can use them on any device that I've installed the client app or browser extension on. I have this working on Fedora, macOS, Windows, and iOS.
It's an open protocol, you don't need to use any of the vendors. My Yubikey is a "passkey", so is my Flipper Zero. Keepass provides passkey support.
For the general public, they already rely on either Google or Apple for pretty much all of their digital life. Nothing wrong with extending this to passkeys, it's convenient and makes sense for them.
> It's an open protocol, you don't need to use any of the vendors. My Yubikey is a "passkey", so is my Flipper Zero. Keepass provides passkey support.
I don't want to use a Yubikey. It's a pain in the butt. I just want to use my Mac, with no more damn dongles.
Keepass is a vendor, and one who doesn't even have a Safari extension.
> Nothing wrong with extending this to passkeys, it's convenient and makes sense for them.
I didn't say there was anything wrong with extending this to passkeys. The problem is the lock-in, e.g., Safari requires iCloud keychain for passkeys, but not for passwords. And there is no plaintext export/import, unlike with passwords.
Nobody can convince me that passkeys are good when I buy a Mac and use the built-in Safari but can't even use passkeys to log in to websites unless I give my passkeys to a cloud sync service or have to install some third-party "solution" (for a problem that should not exist in the first place). That experience is so much worse than passwords.
All of the 3rd party credential managers I’ve used that support passkeys work with safari, and through the APIs that Apple offers the credential managers you can even pick your default CM and never think about iCloud again…
> The passkey vendors state that the goal was to make phishing not just difficult but impossible. This means plaintext access to your credentials is forbidden forever, regardless of your level of expertise, and regardless of the complexity of the process to export/import them.
Care to cite this statement?
> As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.
You can use any credential manager you choose. You don't have to use Apple Passwords / iCloud Keychain.
> The purpose of the so-called "secure credential exchange" is once again to prevent you from directly accessing your credentials.
I’ll accept that the attestation parts of the protocol may have had some ulterior motives (though I’m skeptical), but not having to reveal your credential to the verifying party is the entire benefit of passkeys and hugely important to stop phishing. I think it’s disingenuous to argue that this is somehow unnecessary.
> not having to reveal your credential to the verifying party is the entire benefit of passkeys
I think you misunderstood what I was talking about. The credential exchange protocol is for exporting passkeys from one credentials manager and importing them into another credentials manager. It has nothing to do with the relying party.
1) force the type of passkey stores used (e.g. hardware vs software) when I am providing the passkey store
2) force me to MFA (e.g. forcing touch ID, entering pin or unlock password, etc) when attempting to use a passkey
I'll continue to stick to plain old boring password + TOTP. I fully understand the security trade-offs like phishing resistance but password + TOTP is secure enough for me.
Many/all? also need to have some form of manual input as a backup, so you're not forced to sync all your passwords to e.g. a library's computer just to log in, if your house burns down or something.
The "Vendors Can Lock You Out" part is what makes passkeys entirely a non-starter for me. Especially the additional risk when someone passes away and the heirs are trying to get access to the deceased's accounts. Vendors are well known for saying "we had an agreement with Samantha, and with her death, that agreement has terminated, and no one can be given access that was not pre-designated."
Some password managers provide an offline root of trust which family members can use in this scenario. For example, 1Password tells users to print off an "Emergency Kit" which is a physical piece of paper with secret recovery codes printed on it, which they store in one or more safe places. [1]
If someone passes away, their family members can use the Emergency Kit to gain access to and use all their credentials - including their passkeys.
(The Emergency Kit also allows you to recover your data in the event that you forget your master passphrase or lose all your devices.)
> "we had an agreement with Samantha, and with her death, that agreement has terminated, and no one can be given access that was not pre-designated."
It would be nice if you could use some legal apparatus to ratchet these agreements into a trust. Corps would hate it though, so it will probably be illegal to do.
It’s “illegal” in the sense that you could write whatever you want in your will but it wouldn’t be binding. You cannot force a party into a legal obligation they do not agree to.
The government can, though. I’m not sure if there’s any existing laws pertaining to transfer of or access to general accounts after death (as opposed to bank accounts which I’m pretty sure there are laws about).
My will says that my executor can access my accounts which alleviates Apple from legal risk if they do grant access but I’m pretty sure they are not obligated to do so.
This reminds me of some past political debates around same-sex marriage, where I encountered some folks claiming government-involvement wasn't really necessary because Free Contract could take care of everything. (This was some years back before the US Libertarian party imploded.)
It was rather frustrating to watch: "You're a huge fan of X but don't know how X works?"
For example, two people can't make a contract between them that gives one the right to visit the other in a hospital, nor the right to make medical-care/power-of-attorney decisions. You also can't contract-away the guardianship (or ownership) of children, etc.
I thought the Libertarian claim was that lawsuits would fix everything. Because after your house burns down and kills you due to no electrical codes being enforced, your family can sue the electrician (who might also be dead due to unrelated reasons) and convince a jury that they didn’t follow undefined best practices and be awarded millions of dollars that the electrician probably never had and certainly won’t pay and that’s better than having you alive anyway. Hooray for the free market.
I hate passkeys because when I've encountered them it's always an interstitial between what I just signed in to and where I'm trying to go, it's always a "register a passkey now" with an obfuscated dark pattern bypass, and it's always on a corporate account that I don't need a fucking passkey for.
I don't want a passkey on my logins but there is no way to disable this prompt on the 3 websites that constantly annoy me for them.
Drives me batty. The company I work for is already paying you for the service I'm using. We use SSO for EVERYTHING, I've already 2FA Authenticated the login, and even if I set up a passkey I will still have to 2FA the login.
I don't use these sites in any personal capacity, and I would never use a site that harasses me in any way if I was not absolutely required to in order to earn a paycheck.
You're not going to get any money out of me, why are you torturing me?
Vendor lock-in a serious concern. Just reading through this KeePass issue again and seeing how much pressure the industry is trying to exert to prevent the users from being able to export their own private keys should be concerning. I come back to this discussion every time I see someone arguing in favor of passkey adoption.
>The unfortunate piece is that your product choices can have both positive and negative impacts on the ecosystem as a whole. I've already heard rumblings that KeepassXC is likely to be featured in a few industry presentations that highlight security challenges with passkey providers
Hi! I'm the commenter on that post that keeps being brought up!
I don't think requiring an encrypted backup (with a key or secret that YOU control) by default is "preventing users from being able to export their own private keys".
Hi! I have no issue with having the backup being encrypted by default, except the discussion returns again and again to disallowing any cleartext export, even when specifically requested by the end user.
And on a separate note, I fundamentally disagree for political reasons with the idea that the websites should be able to block specific passkey providers.
Passkey just suck, end of story. The UX for them is so bad. I have no idea how many active pass keys I have. I just have to trust the provider knows what they're doing. Sometimes my authenticator app seems to forget my pass keys which is even more annoying.
Passkeys are fantastic for the vast majority of the population. They solve oodles of problems. No more teaching ${FAMILY_MEMBER} about good passwords, password re-use, trying to explain how to use a password manager, etc. Instead: create passkey, done. Then it's seamless login whether they're on their computer, phone or tablet.
As a tech-savvy user fully aware of the underlying machinations involved with passkeys, I greatly prefer their simple, fast login experience over: username submit password submit TOTP submit, and especially over the much-worse "we've emailed you a code" login slog.
It's great until they break their phone, or spill coffee on it, or just lose it, and now they are locked out of EVERYTHING with no good way to get back in.
Passwords on a piece of paper for better or worse do not have that problem.
Only if they're not backing up their phone, which seems insane in this day and age.
And even if they're not, if they have a computer or tablet, the passkey will still be available there assuming they share an account.
You can also recover your iCloud Keychain via a designated/trusted Recovery Contact (e.g. spouse, who presumably hasn't destroyed their phone at the exact same time), or via iCloud Keychain escrow.
Android syncs them to your Google account and iPhone to your iCloud account by default. Which isn't a perfect solution but, again, is pretty good for most people.
And I just found out recently that you can't log into Google on a desktop without responding to a prompt on your Android phone. Which, if you broke said phone, you can't do.
which is why at the very least your email provider gives you a recovery kit to print out (the equivalent of the notebook) and if you can get back into that account you'll likely be able to get into whatever else you signed up for.
There's no difference here between passkeys and any other central storage be it a password manager or a physical notebook. If you lose that access, well you're screwed. But it always beats having hotdog123 as your password for 70 different sites.
Your credential manager provides this sync and backup capability. There are dozens of credential managers available that work on all platforms. You don't have to use the default one on any given platform.
iCloud Keychain (or whatever the Google equivalent is). And as I said, it's a fantastic solution for the vast majority of the population (which, coincidentally, are also not Hacker News readers).
Huh? I’ve seen zero implementations that work seamlessly across computer, phone, tablet - unless they are all single platform, which I have yet to see anyone actually pull off.
It's a beautifully simple experience for Apple users across all their devices.
I can't speak for other platforms; I stopped helping ${EXTENDED_FAMILY} with non-Apple questions because the crap I had to diagnose, debug and deal with for Windows and Android was worse than ${DAY_JOB}.
Password + TOTP have served me well so far. To port from device to device I just need to log into my Bitwarden account. It is unclear to me what device loss would do to a passkey and the passkey never communicates that information to me. If I set up a passkey on my iPhone, the site prompts me on my Linux desktop. I understand it's fine for people who use single platforms for everything. But as far as I can tell there is no advantage over Password + TOTP. I really hope Passkeys don't become mandatory. I only use them for sites I don't care about or when I've accidentally said yes to setting one up.
If you had multiple devices set up on the site (each site must have done this individually), you just use a different device.
If you had synced your passkeys somewhere (note that the spec allows sites to block this, though I'm not aware of any actually doing so), you sync them to the new thing and log in normally.
If you did none of those, it's gone forever. Do the account recovery process, if one exists.
So it degrades to equal or worse than passwords in all cases (which cannot block backups or syncing, and you can enter them individually by hand so you're not exposing all your passwords to the device, and you can communicate them over the phone or in writing), for device loss purposes.
Restoring access in this scenario is imo one of their worst qualities.
TOTP is really annoying IMO but at least you control it so you can make it one-factor again if it's foisted on you. I made a Chrome extension to do that:
Everyone pretends that you're force to only have 1 passkey. I use 3 "passkey managers": Passwords.app, Bitwarden, YubiKey hardware key. I usually add all 3 or just two (skipping YubiKey).
On Apple devices I get neat experience out of the box, on Linux (+Firefox) I forced to use Bitwarden because Mozilla is being Mozilla.
Yep. I use Apple’s direct support which works out of the box. I also create a second passkey in 1Password. And for truly important accounts (1Password itself, Apple, Google), I have a third copy on a YubiKey stored in a safe deposit box.
I dont want to use google/apple/microsoft for any credential manager because: google is evil; apple has locked me out of my apple id (and lost things like the recordings of conversations with my father during his hospice); microsoft keeps getting worse and more annoying to use.
So ok, I need some credential manager. I used keepass previously... but how do I vet other credential managers? I dont want an online backup. I want my credentials to only be on my computers. So now I gotta learn about which apps are ok, don't have cloud synching, can export files, and be compatible with MacOS.
And I have to learn what is FIDO? Like FICO? why do I need to synch with FIDO? what is it? will it give my credential store to others?
How is this easier or more convenient than a user/pass with 2fa?
I feel like I am going to accidentally leak my credentials and have no way of knowing
In your case it's literally the same "complexity" as user/pass with 2FA. You need something to manage the passkeys, just like you need something to manage your second factor. Everything else you list as a worry is already in play.
FIDO is a standards body which produces specifications used by these systems.
It's not really passkeys that are the problem, it's trusting your passkey to a third-party. But this is still a minor part of the market today, a much bigger problem to warn people about is the "log in with your google/facebook/etc account". Where you're handing everything over to a third-party as well, because it's so easy and convenient.
Passkeys, stored in Bitwarden, give a lot of the same convenience, but without the vendor lock-in. We shouldn't be scaring people away from passkeys, when commonly used alternatives are much worse.
It's the fact that there's no physical artifact that's the problem - there's no file.
You can't back up your passkeys and wind up with something you put in a safe on a USB key or something and vendors have been aggressively trying to make that harder.
Passkeys need a marketing campaign and UX overhaul.
I’m a technical guy, but I really don’t understand what the fuck is going on when I use a passkey. All I know is one day it appeared as an option and it let me login to things. I don’t really understand where it lives, what device it’s tied to, how scanning a QR code on Google Chrome on my phone magically logs me in, etc etc.
The user was not educated on this. Hacker News is the top 1% of computer power users. You gotta understand to someone’s grandma or mom or brother who works in real estate none of this makes any sense nor will they educate themselves on what it is.
Right now, when I go to the security section of my Amazon account in Chrome, it (unasked) prompts me to add a passkey, and the popup on my Mac says, verbatim:
> Add a passkey? "amazon.com" supports passkeys, a stronger alternative to passwords that cannot be leaked or stolen. A passkey for "xxxxx@xxxxx.com" will be saved in "Passwords". Touch ID to Save Passkey Cancel
I don't have the slightest idea what "Passwords" is as the destination. My iCloud keychain? My Google account? My 1Password?
Exactly passkeys are confusing to the laymen (and not Laymen) because it’s is an orchestration across multiple services and devices.
If I’m using a passkey to login to my Gmail via chrome browser but used my phone what just happened - did it save in chrome? My Google account? My iPhone?
OK, on the one hand TIL -- thank you! That's a super-meaningful piece of information.
On the other hand, you can understand why that is not remotely clear from the message. It's a generic term in quotes. If it said it would be saved "in the Passwords application (and synced to iCloud)", then I'd actually understand it.
So Apple is either being intentionally obtuse or incompetently confusing here, and I don't know which is worse. And it's UX crap like this which is why I still won't use passkeys, because I don't know where anything is going.
I update a spreadsheet with all my accounts and money and their values so I know my net worth and its changes, and oh boy every month getting these numbers is such a chore.
Since it's been a few days, sometimes I am logged out of either bank/traders and also the password manager.
So it's open the bank site, click on login/password, password manager browser extension asks to login. Type password manager password. It asks for 2FA. Unlock phone with face. Find app, open app, unlock app with face. Approve password manager login. Click on bank login/password again. I am in! No, bank wants to 2FA with mobile. Unlock phone with face. Open bank mobile app, unlock with face. Get code or approve login. Back to computer, type code or click approve.
Repeat that 12 times for all the accounts, and by the end of it I have neck pain with all the "pick up phone to face unlock" motions.
I am a bit paranoid so I turn on 2FA and passkeys and whatnot, but all of this makes me want to use `123password` everywhere and never change it.
For me everything goes in Keepass. And the only thing I want in life is the ability to change a password from Keepass in a standardized way.
Instead we've got Passkeys and the general promise by omission that I will be banned from using Keepass to store and backup my passwords as I see fit on my own devices.
People want me to trust the corporate overlords who at every turn have practiced lock in and rent seeking tactics.
Totally agree with this. Passkeys are a solution but not the sole solution. There is absolutely a misconception for seeing them as newest and therefore the best choice.
I also think there's still an enormous ignorance from passkey devs that lots of people want to occasionally log into personal services from locked down corporate machines, and the flow to deal this is at best terrible but more often non-existent, and developers with typically enhanced privileges just aren't able to conceive how difficult this is.
This is one of the core use cases for why FIDO Cross-Device Authentication was created. To be able to use a passkey to sign in on a shared device, a device you don't control, or a device where you just need temporary access to something.
On the one hand, that seems really important and I'm happy to know it exists.
On the other hand, I thought I had fully researched how passkeys work and literally never came across it.
So it kind of just continues to support my concern that passkeys are just too complicated to understand. If I'm at another device I need to log into, I would have just assumed I couldn't.
There needs to be a simple mental model for users. I'm not saying passkeys can't underlie that, but I think the UX still just hasn't been fully figured out yet.
If you’re not using bitwarden or equivalent they can’t be moved off a device you own at all, and even with it you’d need to download bitwarden which might be impossible
The biggest problem I have with passkeys is being tied to a single device you still need a flow to reset/get in _without_ the passkey. As you're only as secure as your weakest link passkeys don't add any security.
That said, if you have a mac with a fingerprint scanner they sure are very convenient option.
And don't get me started on terrible vendors like Rippling that only support a single passkey! Madness.
I dropped my phone and it literally fell apart. As a result I have been locked out of my AWS account. The get a phone call verification just does not work. Only saving grace is that it was an account I used to test things.
I keep hearing it repeated, but where does this "tied to a single device" idea come from?
The default, built-for-the-masses implementation of passkeys is called "synced passkeys". They are designed to sync between all your enrolled devices, ideally using end-to-end encryption.
You authenticate with whatever device you happen to be using at the time - phone, tablet, laptop, desktop - doesn't matter. If you lose one, you replace that device and re-enroll - then all your passkeys magically re-appear on the new device.
If you're cross-platform, modern password managers work across ecosystems - for example, 1Password syncs passkeys between Mac, Windows, iOS, Android, and Linux. If you're all-in on Apple, their native passkey implementation syncs passkeys between all your Apple devices. I thought Google and Microsoft do something similar now.
It's a real mystery why people believe passkeys have to be stored on your phone only.
Because by default, they do, and you have to explicitly install software to let it be moved. And even if you do, it’s discouraged and the spec is allowed to deny you access.
> Because by default, they do, and you have to explicitly install software to let it be moved
Apple's native passkey implementation doesn't require doesn't require you to install extra software, and the passkeys sync by default. I thought Google's and Microsoft's were similar - but I haven't tried them.
> And even if you do, it’s discouraged
Really? Where is it discouraged? I thought synced passkeys are intended as the solution for consumers.
> the spec is allowed to deny you access
Yeah but I thought that's for enterprise use cases, not consumer. E.g. employers that want to enforce device type restrictions on their employees.
I don't care what you other people in auth do, I work in auth too, please stop making signing into anything 5 steps.
1. First I get redirected to a special sign-in page.
2. Then I sign-in with my email only.
3. Then it finally asks me for a password, even for services that would never reasonably use SSO or have another post-email receive process.
4. Then I get redirected again to enter 2fa.
5. Then these websites ask if I want to create a passkey. No, I never want to create a passkey, and you keep asking me anyway.
6. Then, and only then, do I get to finally go back to using the service I wanted, and by then, you've lost whatever my `?originalUrl=` was, and I have to find it again.
No, don't send me a magic link. Because then I have to go do 4 more steps with Gmail or another mailbox provider and now signing in has become 10 or more steps.
No, don't tell me getting rid of passwords will help most of the population, and then force all of us to do the above, and blatantly lie to us that it's better.
Apple has offered an “iCloud for windows” app for ages that literally syncs your iCloud Keychain (passwords and passkeys) to a windows box where you can use browser extensions for chrome, edge, etc.
Please don't complain about tangential annoyances—e.g. article or website formats, name collisions, or back-button breakage. They're too common to be interesting.
I think part of the distress experienced by readers is due to mixing the fixed-width font with "text-align: justify". So it's close but not exactly fixed/consistent.
People wrongly think passkeys are like Bitcoin wallets, where losing them means there's absolutely nothing you can do, your account is simply lost forever.
Losing a passkey is exactly like losing your password, which is to say, that for 99% of services, you can reset your password/passkey really easily. There's a prominent "Reset Password" button right on the login form. It sends you an email or an SMS, you click it, and it lets you reset right then and there. You can reset your passkey in exactly the same way.
It is not that easy to reset if you lose your password to your Apple, Google, Facebook, etc. They all have a bunch of factors that they use to authenticate you if you reset your password, and they don't even document which ones they use.
So, if you care about those accounts, you've got to make sure you have backup access. They all let you generate and print "backup codes" (emergency passwords) and store them in a fireproof safe or a literal bank vault. Do that!
As everybody knows, you can't store all of your passwords in a password manager. You need something outside of the password manager to login to the manager itself. That's why 1Password/LastPass is called that; you still need one last password that you keep and manage yourself.
That's true of passkeys, too. You can login to Google with passkey, but if Google is your password manager that stores your passkey, you need something else outside of Google's password manager to login to Google. Whether it's a password, a backup code, a YubiKey, whatever, you need one more thing to login to Google, ideally more than one, so you can back it up and keep it safe.
Security engineers are prioritizing preventing key copying over lockout issues, unilaterally, on literally billions of people. It improves their metrics internally, at the cost of an externality on the entire world. This kind of stuff invites odious regulation as more and more stories of lockout with no recourse surface.
And unlike passwords, there is no good provider migration story. There is a roach motel issue. Yes it is being 'worked on', but passkeys and such have been out for many years, the willful denial whenever you ask people running these standards about these issues is incredibly irritating. The fact they tend to avoid questions about this like politicians decreases trust in the motives of such standards.
I'm curious what the "good provider migration story" you're referring to here for passwords is?
Password managers by-and-large haven't agreed on a standardised interchange format for import/export - a few of them have some compatibility helpers for importing from specific popular competitors but they're all in different formats, no consistent formats.
The above goes for passkeys as it does passwords - import/export will include your passkeys - so I don't see much difference in the provider migration story.
On the other hand, the FIDO Credential Exchange Format does solve the above problem (if/when providers choose to adopt it), so passkeys are at least further along the path of creating a "good provider migration story" than passwords ever were.
They work on all my (not just Apple) devices seamlessly.
I don’t need to copy them.
Non walled ecosystems are nice.
Passwords right now are outright better.
And by the way, door keys could be copied.
People keep falsely imagining that Google is setting people up with passkey-only accounts, with no way to backup their login credentials. Gosh, wouldn't that be terrible?
That would be like 1Password letting you create a passkey-only account with no password, storing the only passkey in 1Password. The whole idea makes no sense. 1Password doesn't do that, and neither does Apple, Google, Microsoft, etc. (We can all imagine them doing something that stupid, but, it turns out, they don't.)
Pre-passkeys, the most common lost-credential scenario was creating a fresh Gmail address on a new device (an Android phone) with a password and forgetting both your Google password and your password for your cellular-phone carrier (AT&T, T-Mobile, etc). Your Google password would be stored locally on your phone and in Google's cloud, but when you lose your phone and forget your passwords, no backups remain.
At that point, you're pretty much screwed. Google can't email you a reset-password link, because Gmail is your email. Google can't send you a 2FA SMS until you get a new phone with the same number, but you can't convince AT&T to do that, because they want to send a reset-password link to your email, which you don't have, or SMS to your phone, which you don't have.
(The cellular carriers don't even allow you to show government ID at a physical store. They don't allow you to take over a phone number that way, because people could then threaten/bribe a T-Mobile store representative to falsely claim that you presented valid government ID, taking over other people's accounts. If you walk into a store, they'll just put you on the phone with customer service, where they'll insist that you provide your AT&T password, or reset your password via email or SMS. If you've lost your email and your phone and all your passwords, you're completely out of luck.)
If Google allowed you to create a passkey-only account, with no SMS 2FA and no way to backup your passkey, that would be even worse.
But, luckily for all of us, they don't even allow that, and they're certainly not pushing it unilaterally on billions of people.
Not every provider does this correctly. Just yesterday I saw someone complaining on mastodon about their passkeys being locked and requiring a phone call to get reset.
Passkeys are exactly as resettable as passwords, which depends on your provider actually implementing things correctly.
If I log in to a site from my machine, and set up a passkey, but then log into that site from another machine, it'll just see no passkey present and ask for my password, yes?
A passkey is a local password on a device that could be shared through all the password manager gymnastics, but its not required as I understand it.
1. Passkey prompts asking if I want to use a phone or security key when I only have one (or neither!) registered. The UI for this gets in the way and should only ever present itself if I happen to have both kinds of devices registered.
2. Passkeys should have had the portability and flexibility that ssh keys have from the start. Making it so your grandparents can use public key cryptography and gain a significant advantage in securing their accounts in a user friendly manner should have been the priority. Seems like vendor lock-in was the goal from the start.
A tech-savvy relative of such a user should help them generate rescue codes, write them on a piece of paper, and store them along with all other important documents. Ideally the paper should also read: "Call me before using any of these codes! <phone number>."
a key based approach is great. Knowing (the passphrase) and Having (the key) is a good way to authenticate.
A passkey basically offloads user identification to the OS (especially a mobile OS). It should not be the only way to identify though.
An ssh-style key + password is fine. A username + password + TOTP should also be fine. But 99.9% of passwords should be in a password manager anyway.
Rescue codes should always be generated and written down when activating a passkey or similar, but this requires certain discipline, some feeling of importance. And many web sites that require registration don't seem important for users, especially one-time users. What makes sense for your Google account, or your bank account, feels like too much ceremony for a low-stakes login like a random online store; losing a login to it does not feel like a big loss to many people.
I disagree. It is very annoying when some service fails to show an option on the grounds that I can't use it. It makes it difficult to resolve problems. If the option is just missing, I have no way to tell whether the company doesn't provide the option, whether the company made some sort of mistake (they can't provide an email option because they lost my email), whether I made a mistake, or whether the company just has a bad UI that tries to hide the option. And don't forget the situation where I tried to google online for some help in using the UI, I found a 6 month old Reddit post showing the option, and I can't figure out if the company changed the UI in the past six months.
They should show it greyed out with a note "no key of this type registered".
Exactly. The passkey vendors state that the goal was to make phishing not just difficult but impossible. This means plaintext access to your credentials is forbidden forever, regardless of your level of expertise, and regardless of the complexity of the process to export/import them. The purpose of the so-called "secure credential exchange" is once again to prevent you from directly accessing your credentials. You can go from one passkey vendor to another, but you're always locked in to one passkey vendor or another.
Any credential system that makes it impossible to write something down on a piece of paper, take it to a new computer, and login to a website is just a gateway to vendor lock-in. You can manually manage your own ssh keys but for some reason not your passkeys.
As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. [EDIT: Obviously I'm talking about built-in support. I'm well aware of third-party software, so everyone can stop replying to this now, please!] You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.
The passkey vendors took some good theoretical ideas, such as site-specific credentials and public-key cryptography, and totally mangled the implementation, making it hostile to everyone except themselves.
This is not true - browsers including Safari support passkeys managed by third-party password managers.
I'm using 1Password with browser extensions for Safari and Chrome on macOS and iOS and it works seamlessly with my passkeys, which are not stored in iCloud Keychain.
> you're always locked in to one passkey vendor or another.
This will change: https://1password.com/blog/fido-alliance-import-export-passk...
I think you know what I meant and are just being pedantic here for no good reason.
Do you think I'm unaware of 1Password? I don't want to use 1Password any more than I want to use iCloud Keychain.
Technically, pendantically, Safari "supports" anything that third-party Safari extensions support. I'm a Safari extension developer myself. But this is totally different from how Safari supports the use of passwords, which is all built in, requires no third-party software, can be local-only, allows plaintext export/import, etc.
> This will change: https://1password.com/blog/fido-alliance-import-export-passk...
This is literally what I meant by the so-called "secure credential exchange" in my previous comment.
1. https://fidoalliance.org/specs/cx/cxf-v1.0-ps-20250814.html#...
But again, kicking the can down the road.
For the general public, they already rely on either Google or Apple for pretty much all of their digital life. Nothing wrong with extending this to passkeys, it's convenient and makes sense for them.
I don't want to use a Yubikey. It's a pain in the butt. I just want to use my Mac, with no more damn dongles.
Keepass is a vendor, and one who doesn't even have a Safari extension.
> Nothing wrong with extending this to passkeys, it's convenient and makes sense for them.
I didn't say there was anything wrong with extending this to passkeys. The problem is the lock-in, e.g., Safari requires iCloud keychain for passkeys, but not for passwords. And there is no plaintext export/import, unlike with passwords.
Nobody can convince me that passkeys are good when I buy a Mac and use the built-in Safari but can't even use passkeys to log in to websites unless I give my passkeys to a cloud sync service or have to install some third-party "solution" (for a problem that should not exist in the first place). That experience is so much worse than passwords.
Repeating this doesn’t make it true. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/authenticationserv...
All of the 3rd party credential managers I’ve used that support passkeys work with safari, and through the APIs that Apple offers the credential managers you can even pick your default CM and never think about iCloud again…
I've already addressed this pedantry: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46304137
No, this is a passkeys problem. Safari does not force lock-in of passwords.
Why in the world would I want to ditch my web browser just to use passkeys? I'd rather ditch passkeys.
Care to cite this statement?
> As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.
You can use any credential manager you choose. You don't have to use Apple Passwords / iCloud Keychain.
I’ll accept that the attestation parts of the protocol may have had some ulterior motives (though I’m skeptical), but not having to reveal your credential to the verifying party is the entire benefit of passkeys and hugely important to stop phishing. I think it’s disingenuous to argue that this is somehow unnecessary.
I think you misunderstood what I was talking about. The credential exchange protocol is for exporting passkeys from one credentials manager and importing them into another credentials manager. It has nothing to do with the relying party.
Completely untrue, Safari on both Mac and iOS supports third-party password managers for both traditional passwords and passkeys.
Until service providers are no longer allowed to:
I'll continue to stick to plain old boring password + TOTP. I fully understand the security trade-offs like phishing resistance but password + TOTP is secure enough for me.Which probably looks a lot like a password.
If he can't get his account back in any reasonable amount of time what chance do I have?
(I see I missed a big HN discussion on this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46252114 - 1038 comments)
If someone passes away, their family members can use the Emergency Kit to gain access to and use all their credentials - including their passkeys.
(The Emergency Kit also allows you to recover your data in the event that you forget your master passphrase or lose all your devices.)
[1] https://support.1password.com/emergency-kit/
It would be nice if you could use some legal apparatus to ratchet these agreements into a trust. Corps would hate it though, so it will probably be illegal to do.
The government can, though. I’m not sure if there’s any existing laws pertaining to transfer of or access to general accounts after death (as opposed to bank accounts which I’m pretty sure there are laws about).
My will says that my executor can access my accounts which alleviates Apple from legal risk if they do grant access but I’m pretty sure they are not obligated to do so.
It was rather frustrating to watch: "You're a huge fan of X but don't know how X works?"
For example, two people can't make a contract between them that gives one the right to visit the other in a hospital, nor the right to make medical-care/power-of-attorney decisions. You also can't contract-away the guardianship (or ownership) of children, etc.
I don't want a passkey on my logins but there is no way to disable this prompt on the 3 websites that constantly annoy me for them.
Drives me batty. The company I work for is already paying you for the service I'm using. We use SSO for EVERYTHING, I've already 2FA Authenticated the login, and even if I set up a passkey I will still have to 2FA the login.
I don't use these sites in any personal capacity, and I would never use a site that harasses me in any way if I was not absolutely required to in order to earn a paycheck.
You're not going to get any money out of me, why are you torturing me?
>The unfortunate piece is that your product choices can have both positive and negative impacts on the ecosystem as a whole. I've already heard rumblings that KeepassXC is likely to be featured in a few industry presentations that highlight security challenges with passkey providers
https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407
I don't think requiring an encrypted backup (with a key or secret that YOU control) by default is "preventing users from being able to export their own private keys".
And on a separate note, I fundamentally disagree for political reasons with the idea that the websites should be able to block specific passkey providers.
Stop the insanity.
As a tech-savvy user fully aware of the underlying machinations involved with passkeys, I greatly prefer their simple, fast login experience over: username submit password submit TOTP submit, and especially over the much-worse "we've emailed you a code" login slog.
Passwords on a piece of paper for better or worse do not have that problem.
And even if they're not, if they have a computer or tablet, the passkey will still be available there assuming they share an account.
You can also recover your iCloud Keychain via a designated/trusted Recovery Contact (e.g. spouse, who presumably hasn't destroyed their phone at the exact same time), or via iCloud Keychain escrow.
https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/passwords-devices-iph...
This is without 2fa enabled on my Google account.
which is why at the very least your email provider gives you a recovery kit to print out (the equivalent of the notebook) and if you can get back into that account you'll likely be able to get into whatever else you signed up for.
There's no difference here between passkeys and any other central storage be it a password manager or a physical notebook. If you lose that access, well you're screwed. But it always beats having hotdog123 as your password for 70 different sites.
It's much more difficult to make comparable backups of passkeys due to all the "anti phishing" / vendor lock-in rules most platforms have.
For phishing protection, passkey as a single factor is better than memorized password + TOTP/SMS two factor.
Bitwarden is my personal choice.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46252114 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42350245
They closed my PayPal account for TOS violation after donating to The OpenBSD Foundation. I wouldn't trust them as far as I could throw them.
All sync seamlessly and support the major (and often minor) browsers.
I can't speak for other platforms; I stopped helping ${EXTENDED_FAMILY} with non-Apple questions because the crap I had to diagnose, debug and deal with for Windows and Android was worse than ${DAY_JOB}.
If you had multiple devices set up on the site (each site must have done this individually), you just use a different device.
If you had synced your passkeys somewhere (note that the spec allows sites to block this, though I'm not aware of any actually doing so), you sync them to the new thing and log in normally.
If you did none of those, it's gone forever. Do the account recovery process, if one exists.
So it degrades to equal or worse than passwords in all cases (which cannot block backups or syncing, and you can enter them individually by hand so you're not exposing all your passwords to the device, and you can communicate them over the phone or in writing), for device loss purposes.
Restoring access in this scenario is imo one of their worst qualities.
Succumbing to lock-in can smooth some (but not all) rough edges and creates it's own restrictions and risks.
TOTP for the win --- it's the simpler practical alternative.
https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/lazyotp/eoihmklnjkn...
On Apple devices I get neat experience out of the box, on Linux (+Firefox) I forced to use Bitwarden because Mozilla is being Mozilla.
Never had any issues ever with passkeys.
I dont want to use google/apple/microsoft for any credential manager because: google is evil; apple has locked me out of my apple id (and lost things like the recordings of conversations with my father during his hospice); microsoft keeps getting worse and more annoying to use.
So ok, I need some credential manager. I used keepass previously... but how do I vet other credential managers? I dont want an online backup. I want my credentials to only be on my computers. So now I gotta learn about which apps are ok, don't have cloud synching, can export files, and be compatible with MacOS.
And I have to learn what is FIDO? Like FICO? why do I need to synch with FIDO? what is it? will it give my credential store to others?
How is this easier or more convenient than a user/pass with 2fa?
I feel like I am going to accidentally leak my credentials and have no way of knowing
FIDO is a standards body which produces specifications used by these systems.
Passkeys, stored in Bitwarden, give a lot of the same convenience, but without the vendor lock-in. We shouldn't be scaring people away from passkeys, when commonly used alternatives are much worse.
You can't back up your passkeys and wind up with something you put in a safe on a USB key or something and vendors have been aggressively trying to make that harder.
I’m a technical guy, but I really don’t understand what the fuck is going on when I use a passkey. All I know is one day it appeared as an option and it let me login to things. I don’t really understand where it lives, what device it’s tied to, how scanning a QR code on Google Chrome on my phone magically logs me in, etc etc.
The user was not educated on this. Hacker News is the top 1% of computer power users. You gotta understand to someone’s grandma or mom or brother who works in real estate none of this makes any sense nor will they educate themselves on what it is.
> Add a passkey? "amazon.com" supports passkeys, a stronger alternative to passwords that cannot be leaked or stolen. A passkey for "xxxxx@xxxxx.com" will be saved in "Passwords". Touch ID to Save Passkey Cancel
I don't have the slightest idea what "Passwords" is as the destination. My iCloud keychain? My Google account? My 1Password?
If I’m using a passkey to login to my Gmail via chrome browser but used my phone what just happened - did it save in chrome? My Google account? My iPhone?
On the other hand, you can understand why that is not remotely clear from the message. It's a generic term in quotes. If it said it would be saved "in the Passwords application (and synced to iCloud)", then I'd actually understand it.
So Apple is either being intentionally obtuse or incompetently confusing here, and I don't know which is worse. And it's UX crap like this which is why I still won't use passkeys, because I don't know where anything is going.
Since it's been a few days, sometimes I am logged out of either bank/traders and also the password manager.
So it's open the bank site, click on login/password, password manager browser extension asks to login. Type password manager password. It asks for 2FA. Unlock phone with face. Find app, open app, unlock app with face. Approve password manager login. Click on bank login/password again. I am in! No, bank wants to 2FA with mobile. Unlock phone with face. Open bank mobile app, unlock with face. Get code or approve login. Back to computer, type code or click approve.
Repeat that 12 times for all the accounts, and by the end of it I have neck pain with all the "pick up phone to face unlock" motions.
I am a bit paranoid so I turn on 2FA and passkeys and whatnot, but all of this makes me want to use `123password` everywhere and never change it.
Instead we've got Passkeys and the general promise by omission that I will be banned from using Keepass to store and backup my passwords as I see fit on my own devices.
People want me to trust the corporate overlords who at every turn have practiced lock in and rent seeking tactics.
I also think there's still an enormous ignorance from passkey devs that lots of people want to occasionally log into personal services from locked down corporate machines, and the flow to deal this is at best terrible but more often non-existent, and developers with typically enhanced privileges just aren't able to conceive how difficult this is.
On the other hand, I thought I had fully researched how passkeys work and literally never came across it.
So it kind of just continues to support my concern that passkeys are just too complicated to understand. If I'm at another device I need to log into, I would have just assumed I couldn't.
There needs to be a simple mental model for users. I'm not saying passkeys can't underlie that, but I think the UX still just hasn't been fully figured out yet.
This is usually a bad idea, and is sometimes expressly forbidden.
But. more generally, there must be a flow for accessing your account when the passkey is not available, and possibly cannot be recovered.
Corporate installs disable all USB functionality, and remove the ability to sync profiles? Something like that?
That said, if you have a mac with a fingerprint scanner they sure are very convenient option.
And don't get me started on terrible vendors like Rippling that only support a single passkey! Madness.
The default, built-for-the-masses implementation of passkeys is called "synced passkeys". They are designed to sync between all your enrolled devices, ideally using end-to-end encryption.
You authenticate with whatever device you happen to be using at the time - phone, tablet, laptop, desktop - doesn't matter. If you lose one, you replace that device and re-enroll - then all your passkeys magically re-appear on the new device.
If you're cross-platform, modern password managers work across ecosystems - for example, 1Password syncs passkeys between Mac, Windows, iOS, Android, and Linux. If you're all-in on Apple, their native passkey implementation syncs passkeys between all your Apple devices. I thought Google and Microsoft do something similar now.
It's a real mystery why people believe passkeys have to be stored on your phone only.
Apple's native passkey implementation doesn't require doesn't require you to install extra software, and the passkeys sync by default. I thought Google's and Microsoft's were similar - but I haven't tried them.
> And even if you do, it’s discouraged
Really? Where is it discouraged? I thought synced passkeys are intended as the solution for consumers.
> the spec is allowed to deny you access
Yeah but I thought that's for enterprise use cases, not consumer. E.g. employers that want to enforce device type restrictions on their employees.
1. First I get redirected to a special sign-in page.
2. Then I sign-in with my email only.
3. Then it finally asks me for a password, even for services that would never reasonably use SSO or have another post-email receive process.
4. Then I get redirected again to enter 2fa.
5. Then these websites ask if I want to create a passkey. No, I never want to create a passkey, and you keep asking me anyway.
6. Then, and only then, do I get to finally go back to using the service I wanted, and by then, you've lost whatever my `?originalUrl=` was, and I have to find it again.
No, don't send me a magic link. Because then I have to go do 4 more steps with Gmail or another mailbox provider and now signing in has become 10 or more steps.
No, don't tell me getting rid of passwords will help most of the population, and then force all of us to do the above, and blatantly lie to us that it's better.
Stop it. Get some help.
You’re still not platform locked…
I use bitwarden, Google and a yubikey for passkeys. Which of these am I locked into?
(quoting https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html)