Many years ago browsers started alerting users to HTTP (vs HTTPS) connections and HTTPS sites using invalid or untrusted certificates.
How is it possible that in 2026 we're not notified by default when we connect to a cell tower with no certificate so our communications is being broadcast into the air completely unencrypted?
You're asking why a government, that is already known for massive surveillance, wants devices that nearly 100% of the population owns to be completely unencrypted?
should'nt you always assume your communications are being broadcast into the air unencrypted unless you're connected with ssl/tls? even if encrypted to the tower the carrier can still intercept all your stuff.
> the attacker can harvest device information and force your phone onto an older, unencrypted protocol.
This is why you should always toggle the setting that disables 2g/3g fallback.
With 4G, for example, your device will refuse to connect fully unless the network can pass the cryptographic challenge that proves it shares the key material included in your SIM card (I know, I know, symmetric keys are not ideal). The best an attacker can hope to do in 4G+ is harvest your subscriber ID (IMSI) or deny you service while you are in range.
Is something similar available in iOS? Apple's full control over the hardware and software should make it easier than in the Android ecosystem.
> software can only do so much. For these security features to work, your phone's modem has to be able to communicate with the Android OS in a very specific way
> Because of this hardware requirement, the full suite of these network security tools is currently exclusive to the Pixel 10 series
How is it possible that in 2026 we're not notified by default when we connect to a cell tower with no certificate so our communications is being broadcast into the air completely unencrypted?
The harder and obvious it is, the better.
This is why you should always toggle the setting that disables 2g/3g fallback.
With 4G, for example, your device will refuse to connect fully unless the network can pass the cryptographic challenge that proves it shares the key material included in your SIM card (I know, I know, symmetric keys are not ideal). The best an attacker can hope to do in 4G+ is harvest your subscriber ID (IMSI) or deny you service while you are in range.
> software can only do so much. For these security features to work, your phone's modem has to be able to communicate with the Android OS in a very specific way
> Because of this hardware requirement, the full suite of these network security tools is currently exclusive to the Pixel 10 series
Edit: whatever the answer is, it needs to work when this pops up frequently, because it will.
Like the notifications are nice, but they're not a Allow / Deny popup. When you get the popup your data could've been intercepted.