4 comments

  • Nextgrid 2 hours ago
    Doesn't this already require to be "on the other side of the airtight hatchway", or am I missing something?

    The Marshal.load docs explicitly have a warning that you should not pass it untrusted data: https://docs.ruby-lang.org/en/master/Marshal.html#module-mar...

    • Retr0id 1 hour ago
      Yes, but that doesn't mean defense-in-depth isn't worth doing. The article discusses how known gadgets were removed in the past.
  • sebiw 2 hours ago
    Which brings us to the old saying: Do not deserialize untrusted data.

    In the context of Rubygems and their specs this obviously is harder to manage but dependencies such as Rubygems are and will always be part of your app's Trusted Computing Base.

    • sscaryterry 1 hour ago
      > dependencies such as Rubygems are and will always be part of your app's Trusted Computing Base

      This mindset is changing, in the npm ecosystem, managing and updating dependencies have become somewhat of a gamble. It is no longer if, its when you are compromised.

      • jbverschoor 16 minutes ago
        Gems/packages should explicitly declare what kind of features they need/want (file, net, deserialization, execute)

        And when the sig. changes, you should get a warning

        Very similar to the iOS entitlements

      • _joel 33 minutes ago
        Checksumming the dependencies in the Gemfile may help. https://blog.rubygems.org/2024/12/19/bundler-v2-6.html
    • wyager 35 minutes ago
      > Do not deserialize untrusted data.

      I think the better lesson is "use safe codecs"

  • mono442 30 minutes ago
    Quoting the ruby documentation:

    > Marshal.load is not suitable as a general purpose serialization format and you should never unmarshal user supplied input or other untrusted data.

  • saadyousfi 42 minutes ago
    [dead]