For those who don't know, automatic reboot restarts your device if you haven't unlocked it in a set amount of time. Cellebrite and other digital forensics companies are able to get into AFU devices much more often. The automatic reboot feature was first introduced by GrapheneOS and was later added to iOS and stock Pixels.
GrapheneOS's default is 18 hours and it can be set to between 10 minutes and 72 hours. iPhones and Stock pixels have it non customizable at 72 hours.
On GrapheneOS, for privacy and convenience, it's best to use a long random passphrase [1] for your primary unlock and then a fingerprint with a second factor pin as the secondary unlock. You enter the passphrase every time the device restarts.
If you're encountering someone that's going to seize your phone, try to restart/shut it down yourself so you don't have to trust the AFU protections.
I keep all of my most sensitive personal documents on my phone, as an emergency backup, but in an encrypted (Cryptomator) volume that requires a separate password. Given the routine news of such exploits this seems like due diligence.
As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.
It would seem wise to at least keep a backup in an E2EE cloud [1].
>As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.
If your threat model includes someone using violence to coerce you, an option could be to use a cloud storage account entirely over Tor from the browser (preferably download the app because of web cryptography risks) with the login memorized. That way you can access it on any computer even if yours is lost and you can remove traces of it from your phone.
If you don't give access to law enforcement when they ask: straight to jail. Encryption is irrelevant in that situation. If they see the encrypted volume you need to provide them access.
Maybe in a country like the UK, but not in the US. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination.
Which covers divulging encryption keys because it is treated the same as compelling you to give up the combination to a wall safe which is testimonial and protected.
That's been my understanding until now as well... the latest on the case against Samuel Tunick has me worried and second guessing that blanket statement though...
So if an app installs an encrypted volume for which you don't have the password to, you go to jail? That doesn't make sense. How can they know if I have the password or not
I get asked to unlock my dev laptop every single time I go from the US to Montreal. The TSA person sits there and waits for my WM to boot before waving me past.
It seems more like they're trying to determine that it is in fact a laptop and not something resembling one.
I believe the parent comment is talking about leaving US, coming back to the US and then having US's border patrol do so.
If that is also what you understood, are you an activist or anyone whom would be of interest to the feds to be asked so? Otherwise saying "I've never been asked" sounds like a common thing for most people.
Ooh, I wonder whether Apple made the classic mistake of using a wall clock timer when they should have used a monotonic (local) clock timer.
edit: having personally gone through this kind of mess, the correct solution is to use strict typing to make sure you keep track of the difference between times and durations and the difference between different clock types. Don’t use plain integers and also don’t try to fudge it the way that Go’s standard library solution does. The modern C++ library is actually pretty good, although you need to use very recent versions of the standard for full functionality.
I wouldnt be surprised if they had a backdoor into the Qualcomm chip that Apple decided to oddly still include in most of their US iPhones vs the international versions that come with their own internal modem
Is it maybe providing a bogus NTP server or something? Maybe the automatic reboot feature can be moved to the Secure Enclave or something, and made to only rely on the hardware RTC in a way that can't be tampered with.
iOS has a remote erase feature. Its also a leaked video and doesn't show which version or model. So it could be something that is already patched, or soon will be. Remember to always keep your OSes update.
Perhaps for a short time. As soon as Apple understands the exploit I expect them to patch it. They may even back port the fix to older iOS versions as well.
Unfortunately not a one I can prove to you online. I have a family member who is a district attorney, so that's my source. He said that that companies like the ones mentioned in the article sell licenses to unlock a single phone to a city or county. The city or county pays if they consider it worth it. The cost can be 5 figures.
(so the people that discover these exploits will sell them to the companies for 6 or 7 figures, far more than they would get from an Apple/Android bug bounty)
GrapheneOS's default is 18 hours and it can be set to between 10 minutes and 72 hours. iPhones and Stock pixels have it non customizable at 72 hours.
On GrapheneOS, for privacy and convenience, it's best to use a long random passphrase [1] for your primary unlock and then a fingerprint with a second factor pin as the secondary unlock. You enter the passphrase every time the device restarts.
If you're encountering someone that's going to seize your phone, try to restart/shut it down yourself so you don't have to trust the AFU protections.
[1] https://strongphrase.net give memorable ones which is cool.
As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.
>As I understand it this encryption is a significant additional barrier to technical or legal access to those files. If someone knows otherwise, please let me know. Being wrong could cost me my home and life savings.
Yes, it seems that way in the US: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49922513
If your threat model includes someone using violence to coerce you, an option could be to use a cloud storage account entirely over Tor from the browser (preferably download the app because of web cryptography risks) with the login memorized. That way you can access it on any computer even if yours is lost and you can remove traces of it from your phone.
[1] https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/
Which covers divulging encryption keys because it is treated the same as compelling you to give up the combination to a wall safe which is testimonial and protected.
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/2026/08/03/giving-police-a...
Having thugs on speed dial opens a lot of doors.
If you really want to keep this stuff on a phone at least stretch to a second phone and keep it somewhere safe.
>CBP only searched the electronic devices of 55,318 international travelers,” the agency wrote, or 0.0013%.
would suck to be one of those 55 thousand people. I've never been bitten by a shark but I sure care about people that have?
It seems more like they're trying to determine that it is in fact a laptop and not something resembling one.
Yes it's bad that the government overreaches, but it is also bad for your mental health to worry about it.
edit: having personally gone through this kind of mess, the correct solution is to use strict typing to make sure you keep track of the difference between times and durations and the difference between different clock types. Don’t use plain integers and also don’t try to fudge it the way that Go’s standard library solution does. The modern C++ library is actually pretty good, although you need to use very recent versions of the standard for full functionality.
Good name.